The Axiology of EU Cultural Diplomacy in Muslim Majority Countries: The Paradox of Turkey by Naciye Selin Senocak
Working paper
The EL-CSID project is coordinated by the Institute for European Studies (IES)
The Axiology of EU Cultural 
Diplomacy in Muslim Majority 
Countries
The Paradox of Turkey 
Issue 2017/3 • June 2017
Naciye Selin Senocak
This work has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation 
programme under grant agreement No 693799 as part of the “European Leadership in Cultural, Sci-
ence and Innovation Diplomacy” (EL-CSID) project.
The paper reflects only the author’s view, and the Research Executive Agency is not responsible for 
any use that may be made of the information it contains.
Working paper 
The EL-CSID project is coordinated by the Institute for European Studies (IES) 
2
Abstract
The principal purpose of this theoretical analysis is to identify the different assumptions be-
tween Europe and Turkey regarding the axiological perspective which distinguishes the value 
judgments used as an instrument of persuasion by each culture. For decades, Turkey’s acces-
sion process within the EU is a highly controversial issue which has been an intensive process, 
brimmed with ups and downs. Due to its geopolitical position and cultural identity, as a Muslim 
secular state, Turkey is a cultural bridge between the West and Muslim countries, making it par-
ticularly important in cultural diplomacy for EU foreign policy. Nevertheless, the cultural misun-
derstanding, the misinterpreted perceptions, the axiological nihilism between Turkey and the 
EU seems to be the sources of tension for Turkey’s accession. The recent official declaration 
by both sides, which is dialectic rather than a consensus, has also deteriorated the diplomat-
ic ties established between them, while also underlining the weaknesses of cultural diplomacy.
Keywords: axiology, cultural diplomacy, cultural identity, enlargement, perception, EU-Turkey rela-
tions, Turkey domestic policy, value crisis, mutual understanding
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Introduction
The European Parliament voted to suspend Tur-
key’s EU membership talks on November 22, 
2016, allegedly due to post-coup purges in the 
country; however, the European Commission has 
warned that cutting ties with Turkey would be a 
lose-lose solution. The EU’s High Representative 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica 
Mogherini, has urged caution, emphasising the 
importance of European values for European 
membership. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Er-
dogan has said that the vote in the European Par-
liament on whether to freeze membership talks 
with Turkey has no ‘value’ to his country, and that 
Turkey could hold a referendum on whether to 
continue membership discussions with the EU in 
2017. Turkey’s accession process within the EU 
is a highly controversial issue. For decades, Tur-
key’s engagement with the European integration 
project has been substantial, and both its advan-
tages and disadvantages have been contested.
In June 2016, the European Commission and 
Mogherini presented the ‘Strategy for interna-
tional cultural relations’ with the aim of encour-
aging cultural cooperation between the EU and 
its partner countries to promote a global order 
based on peace, the rule of law, freedom of ex-
pression, mutual understanding and respect for 
fundamental values1. Turkey has special impor-
tance in EU external policies; nevertheless, the 
cultural misunderstanding, misinterpreted per-
ceptions, ethnocentrism and axiological nihil-
ism between Turkey and the EU are sources of 
tension for Turkey’s accession to the organisa-
tion. Declarations made by both parties in early 
2017 underline weaknesses of cultural diploma-
cy that are dialectic rather than represent con-
sensus. The central purpose of this analysis is 
to identify the different assumptions of the EU 
and Turkey regarding the axiological perspective 
that distinguishes the major philosophical value 
judgments that each culture uses as persuasive 
evidence. Which EU values are pronounced in 
the rhetoric of many EU politicians and are pre-
requisite for EU accession? Which perceptions 
between the EU and Turkey are flawed? What is 
Turkey’s axiological orientation? What resolution 
exists for the axiological clash and ‘crisis of val-
ues’, which is the ultimate challenge that the EU 
faces when persuading the Muslim world to use 
cultural diplomacy? 
The debate on the accession of Turkey em-
phasises the problematic of the EU’s identity 
construction, which raises multiple questions. 
Can we legitimise the idea of a united Europe 
through a common cultural and historical iden-
tity? Can we conceive of Europe as a nation or 
federal state that possesses a homogeneous 
cultural identity? Or, in contrast, can we instead 
opt for building around common ideals such as 
freedom, democracy and human rights while re-
specting national identities? If the construction 
of a common culture is necessarily imprisoned 
in a past that is selectively constituted for the 
needs of the task, the future remains to be cre-
ated and offers choices. In this sense, arguing 
for a common culture that dispels the founding 
myths of a national construction amounts to re-
jecting Turkey as its opponents do. The EU’s axi-
ology classifies Turkey as an ‘other’ in relation to 
the founding myths through which the union af-
firms itself but also with more or less conflicting 
relations. Christianity is among the foundational 
myths evoked, albeit not without ambiguity.
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The notion of axiology derives from the Greek 
axios, which means the philosophical study of 
value2.  It has developed from a certain crisis of 
morality or rationality, from the moment when 
the world of values is considered pluralistic, 
such as ‘value system’.3 Values can be moral, 
ethical or aesthetic; they vary between both indi-
viduals and societies. The concept of values cor-
responds with democracy, the political system in 
which parties represent systems of values. 
The ‘crisis of values’ is today considered the 
ultimate challenge facing society, and the im-
pression of this chaos affects all areas of life: 
cultural, ecological, political, social, financial 
and economic. Even the ongoing Syrian refu-
gee crisis and transnational terrorism in Europe 
have triggered profound existential questions 
concerning the place of values in politics. This 
axiological crisis is part of a systemic crisis and 
raises the following questions: What is a value 
that many EU politicians pronounce in their rhet-
oric? What makes this value different from a so-
cial norm? Are certain values common to all of 
humankind, and can imposing universal values 
be legitimate?
Value has different meanings. In philosophy, 
it covers the axiological dimension. Value is a 
moral preference of a group of subjects. Nota-
bly, a value needs recognition from a community. 
Reflection on values is deemed ‘axiological’ and 
is organised around the terms ‘good’ and ‘bad.4 
Raymond Boudon has formulated the problem as 
such: ‘People tend to endorse a moral, prescrip-
tive or value statement and to experience the 
feeling that X is good, bad, legitimate, fair, etc. 
when it appears to them—more or less vaguely 
depending on the circumstances—as grounded 
on valid reasons.’5  He has further emphasised 
that no theory – whether philosophical, physical 
or metaphysical – can be strictly true or certain. 
In other words, the question should be formulat-
ed as follows: How can one explain the meaning 
of values by weighing them based on ultimate 
principles? Boudon has asserted:
In the same way, a belief such as the belief 
that a democratic regime is more likely than 
an authoritarian one to respect the dignity of 
people is commonly considered as context-
free. Clearly, the citizens of democratic socie-
ties do not feel that being democratic is better 
than dictatorial regimes simply because they 
have been socialized to think so, but because 
they perceive their feeling as right.6
The system of values (axiology) is formed by a 
very complex mechanism. It can be based on the 
following factors: anonymous experiences, belief 
systems, culture and scientific activities. Society 
makes amendments and inversions according to 
its interests. While society harmonises the new 
rule with other related values, a change occurs in 
the composition of other values. In other words, 
the structure we call the system of values has 
a relationship with every aspect of both an indi-
vidual’s life and society. Under all circumstanc-
es, each culture preserves its essence within its 
axiology and the main structure gains sustain-
ability.7  The tendency to judge others’ behaviour 
based on our own cultural norms is the principal 
reason of cultural misunderstanding and may 
constitute an obstacle to cultural diplomacy. 
This paper consists of four sections based on 
the concept of ‘perception from the outside look-
ing in’, the Turkish perception of the EU. The first 
outlines the European Cultural Diplomacy initia-
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tive and its efforts and the willingness to create 
a European identity. The second section intro-
duces the concepts of European cultural identity 
and axiology as prerequisites for EU accession, 
as well as the negative images that Turkey con-
tends with as a result of socio-historical events. 
The third section details the axiology of Turkey, 
the paradox of its cultural identity – which is 
shaped by a forced marriage between the model 
of the Eastern State and the Western Republic 
– and its new politico-cultural orientation. The 
final section further explores the new political 
tropism of Turkey after the July 15, 2016 coup 
attempt and the April 16, 2017 referendum. This 
section focus on the Turkish perceptions of the 
EU and the recent diplomatic crises between 
both parties in analysing politicians rheotorics, 
press articles, reports and recent surveys. It em-
phasises the tensions and synergies between 
the EU and Turkey and focuses on a philosophi-
cal reflection of the EU’s axiological nihilism and 
cultural misunderstanding regarding Turkey and 
European Muslim minorities and immigrants.  
I – Cultural Diplomacy: A New Perspective 
for European Foreign Policy  
Over the last decade, the development of trans-
national terrorism, the political instability of 
certain regions, economic crises, inter-ethnic 
violence, the refugee crisis and inter-cultural 
misunderstandings have transformed societies 
into more obscure perceptions of both their fu-
tures and their pasts. Cultural diplomacy, which 
is commonly defined as ‘the exchange of ideas, 
information, art and other aspects of culture 
among nations and their peoples in order to 
foster mutual understandings’,8  has gained im-
portance since the September 11 attacks. For-
mer United Nations Secretary-General Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali has stressed the following: 
The world has never witnessed as many intra-
state conflicts. These conflicts are of a new 
and complex nature, their causes varied and 
often intersecting. That is why almost half 
of the internal conflicts are related to issues 
of identity. They find their roots in ethnic, re-
ligious or cultural differences, and are often 
exacerbated by repressive measures taken by 
non-democratic regimes. Other conflicts are 
of a political-military nature. […] If we want to 
avoid the cultural conflicts and the clash of 
civilisation which can be intensified with mi-
grant crisis and terrorism we should defend 
the cultural diversity and democracy […].9 
The feature of cultural diplomacy that is con-
sidered the most impactful ‘soft power’ for the 
diplomacy of influence is the process of interac-
tion among and transformation of nations and 
societies. The concept of influence is essentially 
based on the ‘ability of attraction’. The role of 
cultural diversity is the new core concept of in-
ternational relations. The issue of ‘cultural diver-
sity’ within the space of globalisation strives to 
reconcile the universality of rights with the diver-
sity of the human condition. 
Culture is a recurring theme in European policies. 
In times of both euphoria and turmoil, the ‘artisans 
of Europe’ have often engaged in a quest for the 
cultural foundations of the continent’s unity, the 
essence of its identity and the limits of diversity. 
Culture is indeed at the heart of issues of peace 
and war in the world. The identity crisis that Europe 
faces is a key challenge for establishing a strong 
European cultural identity. As Lokorvic has stated: 
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Culture is neither the cultivation of civil disci-
pline amenable to civilised behaviour nor is 
it a depository of traditional, largely irrational 
beliefs inherited from an impervious, distant 
past, it is neither culture in the sense of the 
highest philosophical, scientific and artistic 
achievements nor any kind of special efforts 
[…] The concept of culture is one of the sys-
tems of goods, and of the ways of produc-
ing them which permits these goods to exert 
an influence on all involved by making them 
experience the high symbolic value of these 
good […] Culture is the feeling of possessing a 
special dignity.10 
The European Cultural Convention,11  which 14 
states originally signed in Paris in 1954 and now 
has 48 signatories, was a major milestone in the 
European cultural cooperation process. It was 
the first – and remains the only – general interna-
tional law instrument to encourage the develop-
ment of a European cultural identity to safeguard 
European culture and promote national contribu-
tions to Europe’s common cultural heritage.
The European Cultural Convention has proved to 
be an effective framework for facilitating the emer-
gence of a progressive approach to culture and 
education, the influence of which now exceeds the 
largely limited field of intergovernmental relations. 
Under the influence of the convention, the Council 
of Europe has developed the contemporary im-
age of culture with ‘multiple identities’. European 
cultural cooperation activities have inspired many 
networks to promote the most basic human val-
ues. It has also motivated and encouraged artists, 
scientists, students and researchers from multiple 
perspectives to work towards building a multicul-
tural, tolerant and harmonious society.
In recent years, the EU has been promoting cul-
tural diplomacy, framed in terms of dialogue 
between civilisations/cultures, and aims to ex-
ploit its role in the conduct of its foreign policy. 
European cultural cooperation has been orient-
ed towards European cultural diplomacy. In EU 
Commission press releases12  from April 2014, 
Androulla Vassiliou, the former EU Commission-
er for Education, Culture, Multilingualism and 
Youth, has stated the following:
Culture is a vital part of our collective Europe-
an identity and helps to underpin our shared 
values such as respect for human rights, di-
versity and equality. Cultural diplomacy is an 
opportunity for us to share these values and 
our European culture with other countries. De-
veloping a more active and dynamic role for 
European culture on the international stage 
is one of my key priorities. Used intelligently, 
I believe this ‘soft power’ can benefit the EU 
and its Member States in their relations with 
the wider world. 
To develop a better understanding of the new EU 
cultural diplomacy strategy, it is helpful to con-
sider a recent declaration from Mogherini: 
Our Europe is a cultural superpower, even 
though sometimes we do not recognise it: our 
culture is fascinating for the entire world, we 
are a reference point at global level. This power 
needs to be used, we need to turn it into a tool 
of peace and growth… Culture is a resource 
as well: of course, an economic resource, but 
also a resource for our foreign policy…. Invest-
ing in cultural diplomacy could help strength-
ening the economy of your region, but espe-
cially creating bridges, letting others know us 
and knowing others reciprocally, establishing 
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bonds among people especially during these 
hard times, to prevent fears and radicalisa-
tion both in Europe and abroad. This is why 
we have worked so hard to the first European 
strategy for cultural diplomacy.13
In a sense, this initiative is consistent with Rob-
ert Schuman’s May 9, 1950 declaration that ‘Eu-
rope will not be made all at once, or according 
to a single plan. It will be built through concrete 
achievements which first create a de facto soli-
darity.’14 The initiative promotes improved co-
operation among member states and seeks to 
maximise the added value of European cultural 
diplomacy. Nevertheless, the designation of ‘cul-
tural superpower’ is highly controversial, as it 
can be interpreted as a postcolonial ambition of 
the EU, this kind of dual-sense statement should 
be used with caution.
The constitution of a European cultural identity 
should be a priority for increasing the influence 
of European cultural diplomacy. European cul-
tural identities are often identified through uni-
versal cultural values related to the concept of 
‘universalism’. Furthermore, it is important to 
understand that the universalism at the heart 
of the Enlightenment in Europe emphasises the 
European cultural experience, with its particular 
version of rationalism and political values. 
The ‘cosmopolitan’ thinker Kant, who in his fa-
mous text founded cosmopolitanism, not only 
sought the roots of its ideal governance model 
in Classical Greece and Rome; he also anticipat-
ed a time when the European continent would 
probably legislate for all others.15  The tendency 
towards universalism that Kant expressed often 
co-exists with commendable humanistic visions. 
The ideal of a progressive cosmopolitan cultural 
policy, ‘universalism’ deserves to be considered 
seriously. 
The first challenge of globalisation seems to be 
the continuation of the cosmopolitan ideal with-
out the imposition of a model that is oriented to-
wards a specific culture. However, this does not 
necessarily mean that ambitious projects must 
be approved by ‘global governance’. In 2014, the 
European Commission launched an action plan 
entitled ‘Engaging the World: Towards Global 
Cultural Citizenship’,16  which is in a sense a cos-
mopolitan ideal and has questionable effective-
ness and applicability.
As the globalisation process spreads quickly 
and forces institutions into modernism, it gener-
ates institutionalised forms of cultural belong-
ing. Rather than destroying cultural identities, 
globalisation has been the most significant en-
gine for creating and proliferating cultural identi-
ties. Paradoxically, the real danger of globalisa-
tion is that it generates a surplus of identity, as 
evidenced by various outbreaks of ethnic violence. 
However, the assertion of maximising the impact of 
European cultural diplomacy conflicts with Europe 
itself, which highlights many paradoxes: the non-
existence of a European cultural model, the equi-
librium between European and national identities, 
the positioning of Europe vis-à-vis global security 
problems and the migrant crisis. A ‘Europeanness’ 
in the response to global problems appears to be 
non-existent. The variation in the social, economic 
and political structures of European countries and 
their bonds to national interests will likely remain 
an obstacle for the creation of the ‘European mind’. 
According to Hans Magnus Eizenberger, the Euro-
pean mentality is a conglomerate of national men-
talities that will continue to cultivate diversities.17 
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These concerns – legitimate or not – are the prin-
cipal subjects of many debates.
Cultural Europe cannot be conceived of as a 
simple sum of national stereotypes. Instead, it 
should be conceptualised as a ‘cultural proposal’ 
that considers ‘cultural diversity’ one of the most 
powerful political components. As Christopher 
Kelly has mentioned:
The eve of an important step toward Euro-
pean unity is a useful occasion for reflection 
on the foundation of political unity of all sorts. 
Because European Unity is frequently seen by 
its friends and foes alike as leading to a weak-
ening of nationalism, this reflection naturally 
focuses on the status of attachments to a 
particular nation.18
This is in line with Rousseau’s statement that ‘as 
soon as one man was recognised by another as 
a being who was sentient, thinking, and like him, 
the desire or the need to communicate his feel-
ings and his thoughts made him seek the means 
to do so’.19  
According to Strath, the concept of a European 
identity is fluid and has different meanings de-
pending on the particular type of discourse and 
the underlying agenda for promoting the concept 
of European unity. Within nations, the concept of 
a European identity often varies by gender, age 
and social class.20  Bruter has suggested that a 
model of European identity is composed primar-
ily of civic and cultural factors. Civic factors re-
late to the degree of identification with political 
institutions that define the laws, rules and rights 
having an effect on citizens’ daily lives. Cultural 
factors concern the sense that individuals from 
other European nations are closer than indi-
viduals from non-European nations in terms of 
shared values, norms and beliefs.21 
In his analysis,22  Bruter makes a highly useful 
distinction between ‘civic’ and ‘cultural’ compo-
nents of European political identity. Civic iden-
tity is ‘the degree to which they feel that they are 
citizens of a European political system, whose 
rules, laws, and rights have an influence on their 
daily life’.23  On the other hand, cultural identity 
refers to the perceived level of sameness with 
other Europeans. 
Despite the exhortations for a ‘European mind’ 
that dominate political discourse and demand 
the development of a European conscious-
ness, European institutions and the mass media 
have been cultivating European allegiance via 
a declaration of common values. The German 
philosopher Herder identified a distinct people 
as having a separate Volksgeist,24  which is ex-
pressed through the group’s culture and thereby 
encompasses the whole community. From this 
perspective, a nation is a community that is dis-
cernible from others through its own inner spirit, 
which is expressed through its language and 
culture25.  The EU, with its 28 member countries, 
should construct its ‘inner spirit’ for a common 
European cultural identity. The EU as a cultural 
identity is a particularly complex issue, as the 
question of identity has superseded the objec-
tive of cultural unity. 
It is important to underline the last theme of ‘solving 
the problem of common interest in Europe’. While glo-
balisation increases cross-cultural exchanges with a 
strategic dimension, the ‘competition of cultures’ is 
more focused on market share of ideas and values. 
Evidently, each European country has its own cultural 
diplomacy strategy that is comprised of self-interest 
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foreign policy strategies, which have been chosen 
with regard to the nation’s cultural interests.26 
According to a survey from the Pew Research 
Center, Euroscepticism is on the rise across Eu-
rope. The percentage of Europeans who view 
the EU favourably has fallen considerably, which 
reflects a common unhappiness with Brussels’ 
management of Europe’s refugee crisis, fight 
against terrorism and continuing economic 
woes. The United Kingdom is not the only mem-
ber with doubts about the EU. In a number of na-
tions, the portion of the public with favourable 
views of the Brussels-based institutions sug-
gests that the EU is again experiencing a decline 
in public support in many member states. Only 
38% of respondents in France indicated that they 
view the EU favourably, which demonstrates a 
17-point decrease compared to 2015. Support 
for the EU fell by 16 points to 47% in Spain, by 8 
points to 50% in Germany and by 7 points to 44% 
in the United Kingdom.27 
As the new EU strategy for international cultural 
relations has declared, the main objective is an 
ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe. 
The Pew Research Center survey has revealed 
that in 6 out of 10 countries, more people prefer 
devolution of EU power to maintaining the sta-
tus quo or providing more power to the Brussels-
based institutions.28 
As Charles Grant, the Director of the Centre for 
European Reform think tank, has explained, 
‘Brexit is a momentous event in the history of Eu-
rope and from now on the narrative will be one of 
disintegration not integration.’29  German Finance 
Minister Wolfgang Schäuble has underlined that 
Brexit could trigger a knock-on effect in several 
of the bloc’s Eurosceptic member states.30 The 
most significant and pertinent declaration after 
the Brexit referendum was made by European 
Council President Donald Tusk: ‘Obsessed with 
the idea of instant and total integration, we failed 
to notice that ordinary people, the citizens of 
Europe, do not share our Euro-enthusiasm. The 
spectre of a break-up is haunting Europe and a 
vision of a federation doesn’t seem to me like the 
best answer to it.’31
Pew Research Center survey and the Brexit ref-
erendum demonstrate that cultural unity as a 
cultural superpower without nation-state identi-
ties is utopic, as Donald Tusk notes in the above 
statement. A self-questioning with regard to the 
mutual understanding within the EU should be 
envisaged. Cultural, religious and ethnic minori-
ties in the EU can constitute the foundation of 
the new EU cultural diplomacy strategy. The EU, 
together with its member states, should con-
struct an ‘inner spirit’ for a common European 
cultural identity to promote a European brand-
ing. This identity is a mutual construction, not an 
inflexible possession.
II - The Role of Cultural Identity in 
Turkey’s Accession to the EU
The issue of the European enlargement pro-
cess has revealed a previously obscured prob-
lem. Turkey’s ‘Europeanness’ has always been a 
controversial issue. Obstacles, and even cultural 
barriers, have prevented the integration of cer-
tain states into the EU, as is apparent in Turkey’s 
54-year wait for entry. This is comparable with 
the difficulty of integrating Muslim immigrant 
populations whose customs or beliefs render 
them too far removed from the lifestyles and es-
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sence of so-called Western societies into Euro-
pean nations. ‘The discourses that emphasize 
the exclusive aspect of European identity based 
on geography and culture construct Turkey as 
inherently different. On the other hand, the dis-
courses that emphasize the inclusive aspects of 
European identity construct Turkey as different 
from Europe solely in terms of acquired charac-
teristics.’ 32
Pragmatically, Europe has indeed built itself on 
the basis of establishing a certain number of 
mainly economic links, which essentially aim 
to prevent the recurrence of major military con-
flicts. The problem of identity is inextricably 
linked to the question of the limits of Europe and 
the foundation of its identity and project.
Europe does not have an identity that can be con-
sidered ‘quasi-ethnic’, but it does have a structur-
al reality. History and common values for mutual 
benefit unite the continent. However, attempts to 
render Europe’s cultural dimension explicit have 
been lacking. The French poet Paul Valéry de-
scribed the ‘European’ as having a triple identity, 
which can be symbolised by Rome, Jerusalem 
and Athens: ‘From Rome come the Empire, with 
organised state power, law and institutions, and 
the status of citizens. From Jerusalem, or rather 
from Christianity, emerge ethics and the self-ex-
amination of one’s own consciousness. Finally, 
Athens has contributed rationality, knowledge 
and the spirit.’33  In other words, ‘the subtlety 
and disputed dimension of this identity exist be-
cause the identity refers to different cultures and 
conflicts, thus forming an immense complex of 
ideals and ideas’.34  Europe is not an immutable 
object and has constructed its history through-
out time. The complexity of a notion of ‘Euro-
pean culture’ occurs because it is constructed 
from various sources, as Valéry mentions in his 
essay ‘The Crisis of the Spirit’. ‘Identification 
with the European continent has always been 
linked to the continent’s history, geography and 
culture. However, the current, particular mean-
ings of a European identity have been reshaped, 
expressed and amplified through the process of 
European integration since the 1950s’.35
Turkey’s accession to the EU raises the question 
of the EU identity and value system. The EU’s 
indecisiveness regarding this accession has 
underlined its continued uncertainty regarding 
which axiological path it will take. Europe is ex-
periencing an identity crisis and is divided by its 
utopian political ambition of cosmopolitanism 
and its ethnocentric conservatism. 
Over the past 50 years, the EU integration pro-
cess has witnessed highs and lows, including 
hopes, disappointments, deadlocks and crises. 
Following the 2016 Brexit referendum, it has 
transformed into a disintegration process. Any 
country wishing to join the EU must satisfy two 
conditions:36 
-  Be a state within geographical Europe; and 
-  Respect and commit to the values set out in 
Article 2 TEU, which call for respect for: hu-
man dignity, freedom, democracy, equality 
and the rule of law; human rights, including 
the rights of persons belonging to minorities; 
and a pluralistic society and for non-discrimi-
nation, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equal-
ity between women and men (Article 2 of 
TEU).
The applicant country must also satisfy EU eli-
gibility criteria defined by the European Council, 
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which are commonly referred to as the Copenha-
gen criteria:37 
-  Maintain stable institutions guaranteeing de-
mocracy, the rule of law, human rights and re-
spect for and protection of minorities; 
-  Have a functioning market economy and the 
capacity to cope with competition and market 
forces in the EU; and
-  Be able to assume and effectively implement 
the obligations of membership, including the 
aims of political, economic and monetary un-
ion. 
Turkey’s EU accession process has been a highly 
controversial issue since 1963. An analysis of 
the two afore-mentioned conditions for being 
member states suggests that Turkey is on the 
European tectonic plate, destined to become a 
European country by its geography.38 The second 
condition – namely respect for and commitment 
to the values set out in Article 2 TEU – seems to 
be a major obstacle for Turkey’s accession. The 
argued reason is that Turkey still does not fulfil 
the criteria on human rights, respect for and pro-
tection of minorities.39
However, Hurt emphasizes another hidden ob-
stacle for the Turkey’s accession to the EU: 
 “Even if economic and political obstacles to 
Turkey’s accession are lifted, even if Turkey is 
deemed to be in unambiguous conformity with 
the Copenhagen criteria, European opposition 
to Turkish membership will persist ... the Turk-
ish case is controversial in cultural and religious 
terms, as it involves the potential accession of a 
Muslim-majority country to an arguably, at least 
historically Christian Europe”.40 
Examining the arguments put forward, which are 
likely as important as the admission or refusal 
of Turkey’s accession to the EU, the question be-
comes: Which points separate Turkey from Eu-
rope culturally? 
According to a Eurobarometer survey on public 
opinion in the EU published in 2005, out of all of 
the candidate and potential candidate countries, 
the accession of Turkey to the EU generates the 
most disapproval. Specifically, 48% (Standard 
64: 55%) of those polled were opposed to Tur-
key’s entry, while 39% (Standard 64: 31%) were 
in favour provided it complies with all of the 
conditions set by the EU.41  This result leads to 
the question of why European citizens are op-
posed to Turkey’s entry into the EU. What rea-
sons are behind European opposition? Survey 
data indicates that 55% of the public believes 
that ‘the cultural differences between Turkey 
and the EU are too significant to allow for this 
accession’, and that 63% has a strong fear that 
accession would cause a large influx of Muslim 
immigrants.42  Religion continues to be the ma-
jor cultural difference between Turkey and the 
EU, while Christianity remains the one common 
denominator and a base of unity among the na-
tion-states of Europe.43  Europeans have trouble 
seeing Turkey as culturally compatible with the 
European Union. EU citizens do not believe that 
Turkish accession would have a positive effect 
on cultural understanding, they believe that Tur-
key’s history places it outside of Europe, and it 
does not meet the economic and human rights 
standards required of EU members.44  The data 
indicates that EU’s public opinion on Turkish ac-
cession is based on elements connected to the 
culture and history rather than on universal value 
such as human rights and democracy. The lack 
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of knowledge about Turkey seems to be a major 
indicator that many of the negative perceptions 
held by EU citizens with regards to Turkish mem-
bership may be founded on a lack of cultural 
understanding. The cultural aspect of Turkey as 
a Muslim-majority country being considered a 
threat to European identity has shaped European 
minds for centuries.
Since the ‘Christian-Muslim divide is a central 
line of demarcation between Turkey and con-
temporary Europe’, a historical investigation is 
relevant to identify traces of this demarcation.45 
For centuries, awareness has emerged regard-
ing the threat of Islam in Europe in the struggle 
between the crucifix and the crescent. Opposi-
tion between the West and the East and between 
Christianity and Islam has structured Europe 
on a common ground. Critical approaches to 
the modern period have implicitly assumed a 
binary opposition between a civilised Christian 
‘West’ and the encroaching barbarity of an infidel 
‘East’.46  It is worth noting that since the reign of 
Charlemagne in the 8th century, a negative per-
ception and fear of Islam have arisen as a socio-
psychological and cultural rejection of Europe: 
‘Without Islam, the Frankish Empire would never 
have existed, and Charlemagne without Moham-
med would be inconceivable’.47  To maintain its 
supremacy in Europe, the Catholic church played 
a crucial role in expanding negative perceptions 
of Islam. Pope Innocent III identified the Prophet 
Mohammed as the ‘beast of the Apocalypse’, 
represented with the number 666 as the symbol 
of the Antichrist.48 
According to many European historians, the 
most evident embodiment of Muslim power is 
the civilisation of the imperial Ottoman dynas-
ty.49  The process of Turkey’s accession to the EU 
is a complex issue, as the relationship between 
the Turkish and European cultural identities high-
lights differences in terms of their ‘culture, his-
tory, and manners’. Many differences that are 
perceived as difficult to moderate exist de facto 
at the cultural level.50 
Europeans have viewed the Turks as alien for two 
reasons. First, they were primarily Muslim rather 
than Christian, and therefore not fully European. 
Second, it was the Ottoman Empire that destroyed 
Byzantium, the successor to the Eastern Roman 
Empire that Constantine founded. When the Turks 
seized Constantinople in 1453, they appeared to 
the Europeans as a threat to its civilisation.51   
The conquest of Constantinople in 1453 signi-
fied the extent of Ottoman imperial ambition in 
Christendom, but it also inaugurated a period of 
unprecedented exchange – both material and no-
tional – which undermines the representation of 
a period defined by unremitting hostility between 
two supposedly alien cultural traditions. During 
this period, the propaganda of Catholic and Prot-
estant priests intensified the hatred of Turks in 
Europe. The leader of the Protestant Reforma-
tion, Martin Luther, declared, ‘To fight against the 
Turk is the same as resisting God, who visits our 
sins upon us with this rod.’52  For Luther, the Turks 
were a divine punishment from God for the sins 
that Christendom had committed.53  The two 
sieges of Vienna in 1683 further escalated the 
obsessive fear and hatred of the Turks in Chris-
tian central Europe. Therefore, ‘these histori-
cal experiences of Europeans with the Muslim 
world still have a contemporary influence on the 
hearts and minds of the peoples of Europe’.54  A 
declaration from former EU Commissioner Fritz 
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Bolkstein underlines this prejudice: ‘If Turkey ac-
cedes to the EU, then this means that the efforts 
of the German, Austrian and Polish troops that 
resisted the Ottoman Turks’ siege of Vienna in 
1683 would be in vain.’ 55
The ‘Europeanness’ of the Ottoman Turk was 
also debated in the 20th century: 
The primary and most essential factor in the 
situation is the presence, embedded in the 
living flesh of Europe, of an alien substance. 
That substance is the Ottoman Turk. Akin to 
the European family neither in creed, in race, 
in language, in social customs, nor in political 
aptitudes and traditions, the Ottomans have 
for more than five hundred years presented to 
the European powers a problem, now tragic, 
now comic, now bordering almost on bur-
lesque, but always baffling and paradoxical.56  
These above-mentioned prejudgements stem 
from the fear of the ‘Turk’. The European people 
have perceived the ‘Turk’ as a barbarian, uncivi-
lised and a common enemy for centuries and 
this negative perception is still alive in European 
minds. Turkey’s Ottoman past still haunts its re-
lations with Europe. “The Ottoman Empire and 
its Muslim identity as opposed to Christian Eu-
rope have been crucial in shaping the minds of 
Europeans in conjunction with the Turkish mem-
bership to the EU. In particular, when one starts 
considering the civilizational dimension of the 
European integration project, ideational and reli-
gious factors inevitably come to the forefront”.57 
Turkey’s Europeanness has always been a con-
troversial issue.
After the Turkish War of Independence follow-
ing the collapse of Ottoman Empire, the main 
objective of the founder of the Turkish Republic 
Mustafa Kemal ATATÜRK, was to establish an 
independent modern secular state and to join 
‘Western Civilisation’. He was the first secularis-
ing reformer in the Muslim world. As stated by 
Friedman, Ataturk’s objective was to modernise 
and reach the level of contemporary civilisation 
and remove the obstacles preventing the eman-
cipation of Turkish society;
When the Ottoman Empire collapsed, after 
World War I (…) Kamal Ataturk took two com-
plementary directions. One was toward found-
ing a nation-state to replace a multinational 
empire, following the model created by the 
European Enlightenment. Second, he made the 
state secular, so that the distinction between 
public and private became central, and the reli-
gious dimension was made part of private life. 
He remodeled a Muslim state to reflect con-
temporary European values.58 
The concepts of ‘modernisation’ and ‘West-
ernisation’ themselves represent the EU’s value 
system as an equation. Turkish secularism and 
the Westernised cultural revolution (Kemalism) 
initiated by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in 1923 is a 
national modernisation ideology. Kemalism is a 
democratic and pragmatic-democratic system 
of thought that takes intellect and science as a 
guide59, and it is still unknown in European public 
opinion.
Nowadays, mass media plays significant role in 
the EU perception of Turkey. The mass media’s 
power to impact public perception makes it one 
of the most important influences in developed 
societies. According to Tocci, European media, 
which on the whole tends to paint a rather nega-
tive image of Turkey, driven by commercial logic, 
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largely reports ‘stereotypes, sensationalism, and 
alarmism in regards to Turkey in an attempt to 
sell their product’60. The EU decision-makers’ 
rhetoric based on cultural identity and distorted 
news from some European media sources are in-
fluencing EU’s perception and public opinion on 
Turkey’s accession process to the EU. Now that 
the socio-historical reasons for the cultural mis-
understanding of Turkey and Turco-scepticism 
in European public opinion have been briefly ana-
lysed, the next section presents the axiology and 
new politico-cultural identity of Turkey. 
III - The Axiology and Cultural Iden-
tity Construction of Turkey 
Since the Party of Justice and Development 
(AKP) assumed power in 2002, Turkey has pro-
gressively pursued a new foreign policy that has 
generated astonishment in the great capitals of 
the world.61  Turkish foreign policy has been radi-
cally restructured over the last fifty years. This 
new foreign policy does not meet the expecta-
tions of many political theorists. To cite a few 
examples, many famous works – including Fran-
cis Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last 
Man,62  Samuel Huntington’s The Clash of Civili-
zations63  and John Mearsheimer’s The Tragedy 
of Great Power Politics64 – have exposed the 
role and position of Turkey between Islam and 
modernity without knowing precisely whether 
or not Islam would play an important role in the 
21st century. Hugh Pope has noted and inquired 
about the following:
Turkey does not fit neatly into anyone’s con-
ception of the world order. For centuries, peo-
ple have debated or fought over whether it is 
part of Europe, the Middle East, the Mediterra-
nean, or Eurasia. Some see its current govern-
ment as careening toward ‘Islamist fascism’; 
others believe it is integrating into a basically 
pluralistic, secular, globalized international or-
der. Does its fast-growing economy, the 17th 
largest in the world, make it a rising interna-
tional power on a par with Brazil, China, India, 
and Russia? Or is it a minor player that is over-
extending itself?65
Pope has further highlighted that ‘Turkey is par-
ticularly vulnerable to misunderstandings, in par-
ticular since the Turks themselves often seem 
not to know exactly what they want for their 
country.’66 
According to David Fromkin, the new Turkish 
foreign policy, which he describes in the form of 
Pax-Ottomana or Neo-Ottomanism, clearly dem-
onstrated that the fall of the Ottoman Empire 
broke the regional peace that had reigned for 
centuries and created a state of continuous war. 
According to Fromkin, a new Ottoman Pax could 
be indispensable; for this, it was first necessary 
to train those capable of defending the Neo-Ot-
toman perception. Fromkin has described the 
forces that pivoted the Middle East in the 1920s 
as follows: 
The European powers at that time believed 
they could change Moslem Asia in the very 
fundamentals of its political existence, and in 
their attempt to do so introduced an artificial 
state system into the Middle East that has 
made it into a region of countries that have 
not become nations even today. The basis of 
political life in the Middle East- religion – was 
called into question by Russians, who pro-
posed communism, and by the British, who 
proposed nationalism or dynastic loyalty, in 
Working paper
The EL-CSID project is coordinated by the Institute for European Studies (IES) 
15
its place. The French government, which in 
the Middle East did allow religion to be the ba-
sis of politics – championed one sect against 
the others.67  
Richard C. Holbrooke, a renowned diplomacy 
expert, has written, ‘Today we live with the con-
sequences of these almost forgotten events.’68 
With respect to the profile established by both 
Fromkin and Holbrooke’s judicious and impor-
tant analyses following this analogy, it is evident 
that as an Islamist party -the AKP- is attempting 
to create a new identity in contemporary Turkey. 
This ‘new model of identity’ has undoubtedly 
been designed on the basis of Jean Monnet and 
Konrad Adenauer’s conception of the 1957 Trea-
ty of Rome.69  According to the Turkish political 
analyst Aytun Altindal, ‘the efforts to create a 
new identity are determined by the relations of 
the trio Umma-Republic-State’.70 
It is important to note that in the last general elec-
tions with the leadership of President Erdogan, 
the AKP gained 45–49% of the vote to become 
the first political party in power for 15 years. The 
results of constitutional referendum held in Tur-
key on April 16, 2017 exposed the politico-cul-
tural split and political tropism of the country’s 
population: ‘yes’ votes dominated with 51.41%, 
while ‘no’ votes captured 48.59%. Voter turnout 
was 85.46%.71 As a result of this referendum, 
Turkey will replace its parliamentary government 
with an executive presidential system and give 
the president absolute power. In view of this, 
Turkey has concluded a chapter of its pluralist-
democratic secular state system and is moving 
towards a more conservative-dogmatic political 
system. The results of this referendum are also 
a reaction to the EU. Repressed and discrimi-
nated against for decades, Turkey’s main con-
cern is to build an alternative regional space and 
new axiology by highlighting its Turkish-Muslim 
cultural identity. As stated in Stratfor special re-
port, a deep power struggle is under way in the 
Republic of Turkey. Most outside observers see 
this as the latest phase in the decades-long bat-
tle between Islamism and Kemalist secularism. 
Others paint it as Anatolia’s traditional struggle 
against modern Istanbul, egalitarianism versus 
economic elitism or democracy’s rise against 
authoritarianism.72 The renewed interest in the 
Ottoman past and Islam appears to drive the 
Turkish population to reconnect with an authen-
tic Turkish identity. 
Turkish society has been deeply divided by the 
identity questions. However, for many years 
centre-periphery tensions representative of the 
dichotomy between secular culture and Islamic 
tradition have dominated Turkish politics.
To assess this new political orientation of Turkey, 
it is necessary to study the events and changes 
that Turkey has experienced during the past 90 
years.
It is essential to examine the radical changes 
– which may also be called a revolution – that 
have marked Turkey in this time. It is also critical 
to seek the source and initiator of these changes 
in the comprehension of ‘the State’, and briefly 
address Turkey’s geopolitical situation as well as 
its historical and cultural components.
From Ummah to Westernised Secular Citizenship 
The Ottoman Empire was a complex ‘Ummah’ 
society that ruled for 600 years. Its collapse was 
due to external pressures, military defeats, and 
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external debts, which resulted in the abolition of 
the sultanate and khalifat to facilitate the crea-
tion of a Western-style republic. In his book Dev-
let ve Kimlik (State and Identity), Altindal explains 
this ‘difficult and complex’ transition process:
‘Ummah’ is an Arabic word derived from the 
word ‘Umm’. This word in Arabic is used to 
mean ‘fertility and motherhood’. Therefore, 
Ummah is a concept to designate the char-
acteristics of motherhood and to express the 
verbs nurture, educate and learn. According 
to Islam, the founder and generator of the Um-
mah is God. It is for this reason that the Um-
mah means, the agglomeration of all the Mus-
lims, conducted with the permission of God. In 
the Ummah, each Muslim has a status of ‘Kul 
= subject’, – being Kul is not devaluing quite 
the contrary, it is a concept used to designate 
‘honour’ (in the sense of spiritual superiority). 
In the concept of the Ummah, sovereignty be-
longs unquestionably to God and there can be 
no clergy which monopolizes the divine repre-
sentation as in Christianity.73
Ummah is not based on common biological ori-
gin or elements of socio-historical identity gen-
erators. Rather, it is grounded in common values 
that emanate from a spiritual message. Mem-
bership in the Ummah is founded on the consent 
of its individuals to the common spiritual mes-
sage. It is, by right, co-extensive with all of hu-
mankind.  Ummah represents the universal value 
system for the Muslims, it implies an openness 
to humanity for two reasons:
-  The values of the Ummah are destined for 
all mankind. In practice of the moral rules, a 
Muslim should make no distinction between 
another Muslim and a non-Muslim;
-  The Ummah occupies a mediating position 
between a universal divine message and hu-
manity.’74
After briefly introducing the concept of Ummah, 
Altindal compares it to the concept of the repub-
lic and clarifies the essential link between the 
concepts of the republic and sovereignty. Ac-
cording to Altindal, national sovereignty is the 
republic’s sine qua non. Sovereignty, which be-
longed to Allah in the Ummah, was transferred 
to the nation in the republic. Altindal asserts that 
the Kul in the Ummah is considered ‘an individu-
al’ in the republic:
Therefore, the right and freedom of the individ-
ual are not determined by the Sharia which is 
the declared will of Allah, but by the Constitution 
written and approved by the nation. This written 
document (the Constitution) is precisely a ‘secu-
lar contract’. It is a contract established between 
the individual and the Republic at the level of 
citizenship, and the State is its guarantor. For the 
State in order to fulfill its duty, it must possess 
the secular and nominal qualities.75  
These explanations suggest that it was not easy 
to destroy the Ummah – the Ottoman Empire – 
to create the Republic of Turkey. Religion and 
belief form one of the most fragile aspects of 
societies.
Even though the Turks have adopted secular-
ism with the switch to the Republic, they always 
tolerated the different faiths and religions of 
those they reigned over in the past. Millions of 
Turks, Arabs, Circassians, Lazes and Kurdish 
ethnic minorities who live in present-day Tur-
key preferred being citizens of the republic to 
being the Kul of Allah. Moreover, Bernard Lewis 
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has explained Turkey’s secularisation process 
as follows: 
In the secularization of the West, God was 
twice dethroned and replaced – a source of 
sovereignty by the people, as the object of 
worship by the nation. Both of these ideas 
were alien to Islam. Only one Muslim state, 
The Turkish Republic, formally adopted secu-
larism as a principle, and enacted the removal 
of Islam from the constitution and abrogation 
of the sharia.76   
In his analysis, Altindal has highlighted a second 
crucial point: the difference in the West and Tur-
key’s understandings of the state, which are based 
on drastically different roots. Their connotations 
and perceptions of the concept vary greatly. In 
both the East and Turkey, the word ‘state’ is a de-
rivative of the word ‘Dawla’, which is used to signify 
‘the power to change, to transform’. In other words, 
for this region, the state refers to the force that has 
the power to change and transform. The mission 
of ‘transforming’ in the Ummah belonging to Allah 
is given to the state in the Republic of Turkey. As a 
result, all ‘reforms and revolutions’ are conducted 
in accordance with state-defined permission and 
limitations. In the West, ‘state’ is used to refer to 
‘stability’. As such it is not possible for the state 
to appropriate itself via ‘transformation’, as is the 
case in Turkey (where both the bureaucracy and 
the army have this ability). In Turkey, reforms are 
implemented ‘from top to bottom’; this is the re-
verse of what happens in the West, where they are 
realised ‘from bottom to top’, following the will of 
an organised population. It is the forced marriage 
of the Eastern state and the Western republic mod-
els that has defined Turkey’s internal and foreign 
policy for the past 90 years.77  
Ataturk’s vision of modernisation was based on 
two basic elements that were linked: political 
change, which involved abolishing the Ottoman 
state and its restrictive value system in favour 
of a westernized democratic system; neverthe-
less, the socio-cultural revolution and western 
values were not interiorised by a certain part 
of the Turkish population, especially in the rural 
areas such as the Islamist-oriented Anatolia re-
gion (which are more attached to the conserva-
tive value system). Two surveys78  conducted in 
2006 and 2007 revealed that the most important 
demand for change among the Turkish popula-
tion is related to a return to a revered moral past. 
As stated in an Anna Lindh Foundation Report 
written by Cengiz Gunay, ‘In Turkey, transition to a 
post-industrial age, induced by the shift to liberal 
market economy in the 1980s, triggered a revival 
of spirituality. Rapid urbanisation, unbridled cap-
italism, unequal socio economic transformation, 
corruption, and the influx of new lifestyle-images 
in the course of globalisation have been factors 
which enhanced the feeling of many Turkish citi-
zens that morals and values are in erosion. There 
emerged a call for the restitution of the moral 
order of an idealised past which seemed more 
protected and less complex. Since Turkish secu-
larism had failed to produce a secular moral and 
ethical code, in times of crisis, the demand for 
values fell back on tradition and Islamic concep-
tions.’79 
According to Gunay, secularists and Islamists 
have battled over the role that religion should 
play in public life. This battle has also embodied 
elements of a competition over economic and 
cultural dominance.80  Both sides have claimed 
that their own nostalgic interpretation of the 
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past should determine the nature of legitimate 
politics in contemporary Turkey.81  
The above explanation of all of the transforma-
tions that Turkey has experienced is necessary 
to better analyse the AKP’s new domestic and 
foreign policy and the current political tropism of 
the Turkish population.
IV - Towards a New Turkish Political 
Model in Cultural Diplomacy 
The AKP is a political party that is supported by 
Islamist groups that want to become the new 
leaders of Dar-ul-Islam (House of Islam)82  in Tur-
key and the Middle East. The policy that it pur-
sues would therefore not be ‘Neo-Ottomanism’, 
but rather a new ‘Pan-Islamism’. Altindal has 
called this new Islamic political trend ‘Unitarian 
Islamism’. This model cannot be considered as 
‘Neo-Ottomanism’ or ‘Pax-Ottomana’. In the con-
text of the AKP’s role, the only allusion to the 
Neo-Ottomanism and Pax-Ottomana theories is 
not politics, but ‘geography’. The direct historical 
and geographical links between the AKP and the 
13 emerging countries around Turkey after the 
dissolution of the Ottoman Empire represent a 
situation altogether as a natural environment. It 
is perfectly natural for Turkey to prioritise rela-
tions with neighbouring countries.83   
The Islamic vision was rooted by the Milli Gorus 
(National view) in the 1970s, followed by the 
Refah (Welfare) Party which officially brought 
political Islam and later on, a more moderate 
strand emerged with the appearance of the AKP. 
Though the AKP was more cautious of exposing 
its Islamist-rooted political vision in its early days 
of power, it has become clear that the party rep-
resents those in Turkey who embrace the coun-
try’s Islamic past. The AKP’s vision of Turkey is 
a country that goes out of its way to defend its 
Turkic brothers abroad, that infuses religion with 
politics and that gives rise to what it sees as a 
long-neglected Anatolian class.84 In his political 
discourse, President Erdogan seeks ‘to be the 
voice of the oppressed’. He refers to the Muslim 
world in the following statement: 
We are the voice of our brothers, our friends, 
the oppressed; we are that voice opening up 
to the world’, and that ‘When they tell us: ‘Is it 
left to you to take care of the oppressed of the 
world, tell what’s right and defend justice?’ We 
will remind them that our basic principle is: ‘If 
your brother is in difficulty, you cannot be in 
security and stability.’ You cannot make your 
country prosperous by veiling your heart and 
your conscience.85    
Moreover, Erdogan adds that the ruling AKP pol-
icy was based on enhancing ‘brotherhood’ in the 
region. Keyman underlines that as a modern na-
tion-state formation with a secular, democratic 
government, largely Muslim population, dynamic 
economy and a highly mobile, young and entre-
preneurial population, Turkey was a model coun-
try or inspiration for the future of democracy, 
stability, and peace in the Middle East and Mus-
lim world in general.86 According to The Turkish 
Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TE-
SEV), public opinion surveys conducted between 
2010 and 2012 after the post-Arab spring repeat-
edly showed that approximately 60% of the Arab 
public saw Turkey as a model and believed that 
Turkey could contribute positively to the trans-
formation of the Arab world.87    
If Turkey does not want to be divided, it is obliged 
to create a new space for itself. However, the 
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new Neo-Ottoman or Ottoman Pax theories do 
not correspond with this new strategy. In the cur-
rent situation, it is Islamic rhetoric that can yield 
opportunities for Turkey; Islam, not Ottomanism, 
has credibility in the Arab world. Graham Fuller, a 
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency Middle East ex-
pert, has stated:
It is of course, absurd to argue that the exist-
ence of Islam has had no independent impact 
on the Middle East or East-West relations. Is-
lam has been a unifying force of a high order 
across a wide region. As a global universal 
faith, it has created a broad civilization that 
shares many common principles of philoso-
phy, the arts, and society; a vision of the mor-
al life; a sense of justice, jurisprudence, and 
good governance – all a deeply rooted high 
culture. As a cultural and moral force, Islam 
has helped bridge ethnic differences among 
diverse Muslim peoples, encouraging them 
to feel part of a broader Muslim civilizational 
project. Islam affected political geography as 
well: If there had been no Islam, the Muslim 
counties of South Asia and Southeast Asia to-
day – particularly Pakistan, Bangladesh, Ma-
laysia and Indonesia – would be rooted in the 
Hindu World.88 
The community to which Fuller refers is the Um-
mah (which is explained above). The difference 
between AKP and Ottoman governance appears 
in the subject of ‘identity’. For the AKP, Islam is 
a ‘fundamental identity’, while being Ottoman, 
Turkish, Circassian and so forth is a ‘subordinate 
identity’. The AKP considers the attempt to de-
velop a new identity to be a condition of exist-
ence for the new Turkey.
The Muslim world encompasses 57 countries 
and 1.7 billion adherents, comprising over 23% 
of the world’s population89.  It thus represents a 
substantial economic market that is as impor-
tant as the Chinese market. Turkey wants to be-
come a leading country to guide this space and 
views the Middle East as an indispensable hin-
terland. In this conjuncture, Turkey could have 
a choice between becoming a pivotal power (or 
state) – similar to Russia, China and Brazil – or 
undergoing the threat of ‘separatism’, fragmen-
tation and civil war.
The question of whether the AKP government 
has sufficient foreign policy experience and 
knowledge to play this leadership role effectively 
in the Muslim World is critical. Even if the AKP 
government lacks the necessary experience and 
knowledge, it is interesting to note the willing-
ness of the Arab and Muslim countries to define 
Turkey as a role model. President Erdogan re-
ceives great admiration in the Arab world.  His 
charisma, rhetoric and political positioning in-
cite fascination, and he is considered both the 
‘strong man’ against the West and the ‘voice of 
the oppressed’. Nevertheless, the gap between 
the AKP and Arab Islamists’ political views is im-
portant, some of the radical Islamic political or-
ganizations like Hizb-ut-Tahrir Al Islami are fully 
opposed to the Turkish model in the Arab world: 
‘The Turkish secular regime represented by AKP 
and its leader Erdoğan have not defended the 
interest of the Ummah ever since they came to 
power. Moreover, it did not hesitate, even for a 
moment, to implement American plans in the re-
gion” implement American plans in the region.’90 
The AKP decided to change the Turkish secular-
ism according to their definition ‘rigid secularism’ 
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through ‘liberal secularism’. “The Turkish Consti-
tutional Court has made a revolutionary decision 
on secularism definition in Turkey, it changed it 
as liberal secularism, rather than a definition of 
old rigid secularism, the decision no. 2012/128 
was published in the Official Journal. Liberal 
secularism refers to liberal democracy and tol-
erance; it is increasingly replacing rigid secular-
ism, which is more dogmatic and conceived on 
the basis of a radical republic”91.
Relations between Turkey and the EU are under-
going a radical change. In 2004, then Prime Min-
ister Erdogan proclaimed that the EU is a ‘union 
of values’ and that he aimed to make ‘European 
values Ankara’s values’.92  Today, he stresses: 
If we look at to the past from the perspective 
of values, we can see that they never keep 
their words. They won’t this time either. I am 
aware. Why? In the past, when a negotiation 
chapter would be opened, it had to be closed 
as well. Only the chapter on education could 
be closed. There are now 14 chapters opened 
but none of them closed. Why? Because they 
have suspended the closure of chapters. 
Why? This is Turkey. When they implement 
this for another country, they immediately 
close them.93  
Since Turkey has new strategic partners in Rus-
sia, Iran, China and Qatar, it is less stimulated by 
relations with the EU, which has been confronted 
by many economic and structural crises (such as 
those evident in Greece, Portugal and the Brexit 
event). Turkey has suggested that it may instead 
join the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, an 
economic bloc that includes China and Russia.
The rhetoric of many European leaders, including 
Nicolas Sarkozy, Angela Merkel and Sebastian 
Kurz, communicates, ‘We are never going to admit 
Turkey within the European Union since we don’t 
share the same values.’ This has had impressive 
repercussions on polls in Turkey. According to a 
survey conducted by the German-based Turkish 
European Foundation for Education and Scien-
tific Studies (TAVAK) in 2008, 80% of the Turk-
ish population was in favour of integration into 
the EU; this rate has since dropped to 17-19% in 
2016.94  The Turkish people have lost their con-
fidence in Europe, and a growing and culturally 
imbedded opposition to the idea of Turkish EU 
membership exists. The Turkish public is aban-
doning EU-related hopes due to the rise of Islam-
ophobia, as well as to Turcophobia and negative 
perceptions of Turkey in Europe. 
After the deadly coup attempt organised by the 
Gulenist Radical Islamist Terrorist Group (FETO) 
on July 15, 2016 marked a turning point in Tur-
key’s political history with the EU, with Turkey 
feeling betrayed by the EU. The Turkish foreign 
affairs minister declared, ‘Unfortunately the EU is 
making some serious mistakes. They have failed 
the test following the coup attempt ... Their is-
sue is anti-Turkey and anti-Erdogan sentiment.’95 
For many Turks, the failed coup attempt signified 
the rebirth of modern Turkey; it was a victory of 
‘democracy’ over Occidental enemies who want-
ed to destabilise the country. After the event, 
President Erdogan appealed to the unity of the 
country and received support from the main op-
position, namely the Republican People’s Party 
(CHP) and the far-right Nationalist Movement 
Party (MHP) President Erdogan declared, ‘Every 
coup which does not kill us, makes us stronger. 
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Just like here and now.’96  Regardless of ethnic, 
religious, cultural, class and lifestyle differences, 
Turkish citizens were united against the coup. 
From political parties to economic actors, from 
media to civil society organisations. The unity 
displayed by Turkish citizens was remarkable in 
the name of protecting democracy over military 
rule, living together rather than polarization.97
According to several press articles and reports, 
the lack of empathy and support by European 
media and politics, which emphasised on its anti-
Erdogan propaganda, at the result of the coup at-
tempt that was regarded as a ‘victory of democ-
racy’ by the Turkish population; created a sense 
of disappointment among the Turks, who inter-
preted their reaction as a Western plot against 
their country’s integrity98. “There are several the-
ories as to who was behind this failed coup at-
tempt. One theory suggests it was a ‘false flag’ 
event staged by President Erdogan to gain more 
power, but common sense dictates the event 
went too far to be a false flag”99. The Turkish gov-
ernment accused Europe of hypocritically inter-
preting democracy and values according to its 
self-interest.100 This situation has intensified the 
nationalistic feelings of Turks, invoking the prov-
erb ‘the Turk has no other friend than the Turk’. 
The discrimination against President Erdogan is 
considered discrimination against Turkey and 
the Turkish population.101
Since the coup attempt, Turkey has suspended 
the European Convention on Human Rights and 
declared a state of emergency. Erdogan has ac-
cused FETO of being a ‘parallel state’ within the 
Turkish state. The government began purging 
those who were suspected of involvement in the 
coup or affiliated with the Gulenist movement. 
Thousands of soldiers, police officers, judges, 
civil servants and teachers have been suspend-
ed, detained or placed under investigation so 
far.102  
For years, the AKP government gave full power to 
the FETO and accepted the infiltration of Gulen’s 
followers as diplomats, bureaucrats and civil 
servants into state institutions. According to a 
Stratfor special report, the Gulen movement has 
spent the past three decades working aggres-
sively in the education sector to mould young 
minds in Turkish schools at home and abroad. 
The goal is to create a generation of well-edu-
cated Turks who ascribe to the Gulen tradition 
and have the technical skills (and under the AKP, 
the political connections) to assume high posi-
tions in strategic sectors of the economy, gov-
ernment and armed forces.103 The political mar-
riage between FETO and the AKP exploded in 
December 2013, as Gulen-linked officials raided 
the homes of dozens of individuals, initiating a 
ground-shaking corruption scandal that involved 
President Erdogan himself.104  Since then, the 
president has publicly expressed regret over his 
once-friendly relations with Fethullah Gulen, lik-
ening what he perceives as ‘betrayal’ by Gulen 
and the Gulenist movement to being stabbed in 
the back.105 
European Parliament President Martin Schulz 
has accused Turkey of enacting ‘revenge’ against 
its opponents and critics. He has also said that 
a debate over restoring the death penalty in the 
country is ‘deeply worrying’; indeed, the EU has 
warned that such a move would end talks over 
Turkey joining the bloc.106 
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As a result, an escalation of tension between the 
EU and Turkey has been unavoidable. The Euro-
pean Parliament’s suspension of negotiations 
with Turkey in November 2016 has jeopardised 
a fragile deal reached by the two sides. Turk-
ish Prime Minister Binali Yildirim has asserted 
that relations between the parties were already 
strained, and that the vote would not have much 
consequence: ‘It is a relationship going grudg-
ingly, with difficulty. The EU should understand 
this; it should decide whether it wants to shape 
its vision for the future with Turkey or without 
Turkey.’107 
Relations between Turkey and European coun-
tries have deteriorated since the attempted coup 
in Turkey in July 2016, the disproportionate EU-
wide ban on Turkish politicians campaigning 
inside Europe and the EU’s suspicion about the 
referendum results’ legitimacy. 
According to the Anatolian Press Agency, more 
than 60% of Turkish expatriates living in Europe 
casted ‘yes’ votes on the referendum to enhance 
the power and scope of the Turkish presidency; 
in contrast, more than 60% in Middle Eastern 
countries voted ‘no’.108  Nearly 76% of the Turks 
in Belgium voted for the proposal, which repre-
sents the highest percentage in Europe; Austria 
was in second place, with more than 72%. While 
only 51.3% of Turks actually living in Turkey want 
more autocracy, those living outside – and pre-
cisely in the heart Europe – are more enthusias-
tic about political limitations in their home coun-
try.109  
The outcome of the referendum in Turkey had 
immediate repercussions in European countries. 
Flemish Christian Democrats (CD&V) lawmaker 
Hendrik Bogaert called for the abolition of dual 
citizenship, saying: ‘We cannot say that nothing 
has happened. Such dual nationality is not con-
ducive to integration. One is eventually more en-
gaged in foreign than in Belgian politics.’110 
Deutsche Welle’s Editor-in-Chief Ines Pohl has ar-
gued a similar line, stating: ‘If so many people liv-
ing in Germany support a man who wants, among 
other things, to reintroduce the death penalty, 
then, all attempts at integration notwithstanding, 
things have gone very wrong somewhere’.111
Both Europe and Turkey should judiciously ana-
lyse the outcome of the Turkish referendum. 
Europe should reconsider its Turco-sceptic posi-
tioning that has persisted for 54 years and how 
its anti-Erdogan stance is seen as a pretext for 
Turkey’s non-accession to the EU. 
Tensions between Europe and Turkey are likely to 
result in a ‘lose-lose’ situation. The EU accession 
process has created many positives for citizens 
of the Republic of Turkey such as; a modern, dy-
namic, and inclusive market economy with regu-
lated cooperation, social welfare, healthcare and 
labour standards, a predictable justice system, 
participation in European education, technology 
and social development programs and greatly 
increased exports, high-standard food and in-
dustrial products, consumer rights, and environ-
mental regulations due to the Customs Union.112 
Solutions should employ a new form of coopera-
tion in terms of cultural relativism, taking into 
consideration that Turkey is in the history of Eu-
rope, but not in its culture – which is a prerequi-
site for its accession to the EU.
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Conclusion 
As a source of cultural misunderstanding, ‘axi-
ological nihilism’, due to blind ethnocentrism, is 
the main reason for the escalation of tensions 
between EU and Turkey. Certain cultural differ-
ences have been dramatised and have led to the 
common misperception that Turkey’s cultural 
values are irreconcilable with European civilisa-
tion. This general misperception can be easily 
traced to the general lack of knowledge that EU 
citizens seem to have about Turkish society.                   
The rationalists explain that social subjects have 
axiological beliefs for strong reasons, which can 
be accepted by others and understood by an out-
sider.113  Cognitive theories seek to demonstrate 
that values and norms result from irrefutable 
deductions because they are part of a universal 
rationality. EU’s values cannot pretend to be uni-
versal, the system of value is culturally depend-
ent, and no moral principles can be made to ap-
ply to all cultures. The ideological opposition of 
moral universalism is cultural relativism, which 
proclaims the equality of cultures.
Many European philosophers have criticised 
the concept of universalism and claimed that it 
leads populations to a form of cultural nihilism 
and the decadence of the Western civilisation. 
Pocock argues in an essay that the EU presently 
offers ‘nothing’; to become ‘European’ is to con-
sider one’s national history irrelevant and leave it 
behind, but without being offered something of 
equal affective value in return. To some observ-
ers and many EU citizens, the most striking fea-
ture of the EU is its essential lack of identity.114  
The EU’s values create social exclusion, identity 
crisis within Muslim minorities in Europe who 
are culturally perceived as the ‘others’. The so-
cial exclusion of Muslim in Europe is undeniably 
linked to the identity crises which have rendered 
European Muslims vulnerable to Islamist radi-
calisation and indoctrination. Olivier Roy, one of 
France’s most distinguished scholars of Islam, 
has called European Muslim migrants who join 
terrorist groups the ‘Generation of Nihilists’. Mar-
ranci has also argued the following:
However, Muslim immigrants have to deal with 
a schizophrenic language and political behav-
iour. On the one hand, Europe asks them to 
become part of it, in other words to become, 
if not ‘fully’ Europeans, at least Muslims of Eu-
rope; in other words, Muslims that re-elaborate 
their cultural and religious identity to become 
citizens of a new Europe, which include also 
Islam. But, at the same time, Europe acts in a 
way that Muslims can only remain Muslims in 
Europe; in other words, aliens in a Christocen-
tric European environment to whom tolerance 
might be only granted. It is Islamophobia and, 
in particular, what could be called institutional 
Islamophobia that prevents Muslims to be-
come of Europe.115 
The analysis of controversial French philoso-
pher Michel Onfray should also be considered: 
‘The mistake of the West is the ignorance of Is-
lam and its rejection to be recognised as a civi-
lization’. Onfray compares the West and Islam: 
‘Judeo-Christianity ruled for two millennia. An 
honorable period for a civilization. The boat now 
sinks: we can only sink with elegance.  We have 
nihilism, they have fervour; we are exhausted, 
they have a great health; we have the past for 
us; they have the future for them’. He claims that 
Europe no longer has values; it has lost its spir-
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ituality. According to Onfray, Europe is forgetting 
the philosophical lessons of Hegel and Spren-
gler: civilisations are born, grow, live, culminate, 
decay, collapse and disappear to make room 
for a new civilisation to be taken into considera-
tion. In this context, the new civilisation is Islam, 
which represents a true spirituality and values to 
defend. The Ummah is a community that repre-
sents a universality in which the individual finds 
an existence and an identity”.116   
Despite Onfray’s pessimistic and controversial 
analysis, Europe should question the relevance 
of its universal values. Cultural relativism seems 
essential for both promoting cultural exchanges 
and understanding and integrating with other 
cultures. For centuries, cultural and scientific 
exchanges between the East and West have 
produced innovation and progress in the world, 
even during dark moments in history such as the 
Crusades. This enriching exchange stagnated 
after the French Revolution and the Age of En-
lightenment, during which the West perceived 
universalism as an absolute truth. The European 
willingness to build a cultural identity based on 
global cultural citizenship cannot bring a sense 
of openness to the world, but it could simply iso-
late it.
Europe should develop a new axiology that is 
adapted to 21st century challenges, taking all of 
the parameters of other cultures and the failures 
of the past into account. Its relation with Turkey 
can constitute a basis for creating a new ap-
proach. Cultural diversity remains a major force 
for European integration. Cultural diversity rep-
resents a wide-ranging resource for innovation, 
growth and local economic, social and cultural 
development, making possible an opening up to 
other cultures and an inflow of new knowledge, 
methodologies, skills and ideas which increase 
a society’s creativity and make it better able to 
face up to new situations, crises and challeng-
es.117  The success of European cultural diploma-
cy in Muslim majority countries will depend on 
the success of its public diplomatic efforts with 
the European Muslim community and their inte-
gration into the European secular public sphere.
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